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I. INTRODUCTION
People outside the medical profession have likely heard of the
long hours that doctors keep, but are probably unaware of the low
salaries and nonnegotiable contracts that medical school graduates
must accept upon entering a residency program. In fact, young
doctors are among the few professionals who do not find postgraduate
employment in the open job market. Currently, fourth-year medical
students seeking postgraduate residency training participate in a
process that matches them to a single residency program.1 This match
dictates where the new doctor will spend the next three to seven years
of her career.2 Upon receiving a match, the doctor must enter the
particular program. 3 This system has been in place for over fifty years
without any significant challenges. But, does the matching process
actually work well, or have residents simply failed to consider whether
they had any other choice?
In May of 2002, a group of former medical residents filed a
class action lawsuit alleging that the National Resident Matching
Program (NRMP or the Match) illegally prevents residents from
enjoying competitive compensation and employment terms. 4 The case,
Jung v. Association of American Medical Colleges, which has been
consolidated as In re Resident Physicians Antitrust Litigation,
5
1. See infra Part II.B.2.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part II.B.3.
4. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, NRMP Statement on Litigation, at
http://www.nrmp.org/memo-litigations.html (last modified May 30, 2002).
5. Complaint, Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls. (D.D.C. filed May 7, 2002) [hereinafter
Complaint], http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/jungcomplaint/jung-nrmp.pdf. On September 2,
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spotlights the heated issue of how medical residents are treated on the
job and how the medical community should be treated under the law.
The outcome of the case has far-reaching implications both for all
United States medical residency programs and for United States
graduate medical education. Much has been written about resident
working hours, leading to recent notable reforms. 6 For the first time,
however, Jung opens the door to discussion about resident
remuneration and the legality of a binding employment process
unique to the medical profession. This controversial case has polarized
members of the medical community. In part, the controversy
represents a power struggle between the medical establishment and
young doctors-in-training.
7
The central issue in Jung is whether the current system
violates antitrust laws by depressing medical resident wages below
fair market value.8 This Note contends that it does and advocates
facilitating competition by providing a limited number of matches
from which residents may choose. With the proposed reforms, the
resident placement process will not only better serve the needs of both
residents and programs but will comply with antitrust laws.
This Note examines where medical resident placement has
been, where it is now, and where it should go. Part II explains the
mechanics of graduate medical education and then discusses the
NRMP and how it facilitates student placement. Part III documents
the chronological development of residents' efforts to improve their
working conditions. Part IV analyzes the relevant antitrust principles
governing the Jung case.
Part V concludes that the Jung plaintiffs have a meritorious
antitrust claim. It then considers resident placement options in a
post-Jung era by examining the consequences of both a legislative
2002, the NRMP filed a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration. Nat'l Resident Matching
Program, Save the Match, FAQ, What's Happening in the Lawsuit?, at
http://www.savethematch.org/faq/all.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2003). Seven other defendants
(one medical school and six medical organizations) each filed motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. Eighteen of the defendants (two medical
organizations and sixteen teaching hospitals) filed motions to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction due to insufficient contacts with the District of Columbia. Id. The court heard
arguments on these motions on February 26, 2003. Id. No rulings had been issued by the time
of publication. Association of American Medical Colleges, Reporter, Court Hears Arguments in
NRMP Suit Hearing, http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/april03/nrmp.htm (discussing the
various outstanding motions and their grounds) (last visited Nov. 11, 2003). For simplicity, this
Note will reference the case as Jung.
6. See infra Part III.A-B.
7. See Stephen L. Cohen, Doctors-in-Training: Our Last Indentured Servants, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2000, at M2, 2000 WL 25931824.
8. See infra Part IV.
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exemption to preserve the NRMP as well as its possible abolition of
the NRMP in favor of an unfettered labor market. Part V also
discusses the similarities and differences between these two
approaches and proposes combining the Match and free market
systems under a revised program that includes binding dual
matching. Finally, Part VI demonstrates how this proposal
harmonizes the competing interests of students, hospitals, and the
government.
II. ANATOMY OF THE RESIDENCY: GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION
AND THE NATIONAL RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM
Medical education in the United States consists of two distinct
phases, both of which are required to gain a license to practice
medicine.9 Medical school, the first phase, takes four years and
includes classroom, laboratory, and clinical experiences provided by
the school and its affiliated hospitals. 10 Students who successfully
complete medical school receive an M.D. degree.1" During residency,
the second phase, novice physicians work in teaching hospitals where
they gain in-depth training under the supervision of senior residents
and attending physicians.' 2 While many states require only one year
of residency for licensure, the American Board of Medical Specialties
requires additional varying numbers of years for certification as a
specialist. 13  The Accreditation Council on Graduate Medical
Education (Accreditation Council) oversees the nation's residency
system and is responsible for authorizing all of the nation's
approximately 7,800 residency programs.14
State and federal governments are the primary financiers of
graduate medical education, with individual hospitals subsidizing the
remainder of program costs. 15  Medicare, the largest sponsor,





13. Id. The ABMS certifies a physician as a specialist. Id.; see Am. Bd. of Med. Specialties,
About ABMS, at http://www.abms.org/about.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
14. Michael Romano, Preserving Quality of Education: Accreditation Council Limits
Residents' Work Week, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 17, 2002, at 17, available at 2002 WL
9525097; see Katherine Huang, Note, Graduate Medical Education: The Federal Government's
Opportunity to Shape the Nation's Physician Workforce, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 175, 185 (1999).
15. Am. Med. Assoc., Graduate Medical Education Funding, at http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/category/2391.html (last updated Sept. 4, 2003); see also AM. MED. ASSOC., REPORT G(A-
99): MEDICARE FUNDING OF GME 1-2, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/upload/mm/ 16/
repga99.doc (last visited Sept. 1, 2003). See generally Mahdi Bsha et al., Graduate Medical
[Vol. 56:14391442
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contributed $2.2 billion in 1999 to cover the direct costs of graduate
medical education, including resident salaries, supervisory costs, and
related overhead.16 To compensate for higher operating costs
associated with managing a residency program, teaching hospitals
received an additional $3.7 billion from Medicare in 1999.17
A. Residency as a Prerequisite for Licensure
Residency is the period of clinical training required of all
medical school graduates before they can independently practice
medicine.18 Teaching hospitals and academic health centers provide
this necessary training. 19 Residencies serve as the sole entry point
into the physician workforce for both domestic and foreign medical
school graduates. 20 Although the primary purpose of a residency is to
educate the residents, residents provide most of the patient care in
teaching hospitals.21  As a result, residents are a vital group of
inexpensive yet highly skilled professionals available to treat
patients.
22
B. NRMP as the Vehicle for Obtaining a Residency
Formed in 1952, the NRMP 23 is a private nonprofit corporation
that matches United States residency and fellowship applicants to
participating programs. 24 The NRMP's corporate charter states that it
is "organized exclusively for matching the preferences of applicants for
residencies with the hospitals' choices of their applicants, in order to
assist medical students and others in obtaining, to the extent possible,
Education Primer, (discussing the current and proposed sources of GME funding), at
http://www.amsa.org/hp/gmeprimer.cfm Oast visited Nov. 13, 2003).
16. Am. Med. Assoc., Graduate Medical Education Funding, supra note 15.
17. Id. Higher costs are due to more complicated cases, additional tests ordered by
residents as part of the learning process, and reduced patient care productivity by all staff
members. Id.





23. The NRMP is managed by the Association of American Medical Colleges and is
sponsored by the American Medical Association, the Association of American Medical Colleges,
the American Hospital Association, the Council of Medical Specialty Societies, and the American
Board of Medical Specialties. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, at http://www.nrmp.org (last
modified Aug. 13, 2002).
24. Marcia Coyle, Resident Physicians Ask Court for Relief, NAT'L L.J., May 20-27, 2002, at
Al, WL 5/20/02 NLJ Al; Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 22.
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their choices of residencies."25 The NRMP operates sixteen residency
matching programs in addition to the Specialties Matching Service,
which provides fellowship positions for training beyond the initial
residency. 26 Each year, roughly 30,000 graduates of U.S. and foreign
medical schools enter the NRMP, vying for approximately 20,000
entry-level residency positions in accredited programs. 27 On average,
more than 92% of U.S. medical school seniors obtain their first-year
residency positions through the Match. 28
1. History of the Match
The NRMP was originally created after World War II when the
number of residency positions greatly exceeded the number of
residents. 29 Due to a recurring surplus of positions, hospitals sought to
employ the best candidates as early as possible. 30 Medical students
were often forced to settle for positions before they could explore their
full range of options. 31 These so-called "exploding offers" required an
25. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, Save the Match, FAQ, What is the Purpose of the
NRMP?, at http://www.savethematch.org/faq/all.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2003). Entry-level
residency matching includes positions for postgraduate year 1 (PGY-1) and postgraduate year 2
(PGY-2). Nat'l Resident Matching Program, Save the Match, FAQ, How Many Matching
Programs Does the NRMP Operate?, at http://www.savethematch.org/faq/all.aspx (last visited
Nov. 11, 2003). In 2003, the Match included 20,908 PGY-1 positions offered by programs in
twenty-four specialty areas, as well as 2.457 PGY-2 positions in fifteen disciplines. Id.
Simultaneous matching for PGY-1 and PGY-2 positions allows applicants who wish to obtain a
one-year position in a general medicine program to obtain a position for subsequent training in a
related specialty area at the same time. Id.
26. The NRMP operates fifteen matching programs for thirty-one types of advanced
residency, or fellowship, positions through the Specialties Matching Service. Nat'l Resident
Matching Program, Save the Match , FAQ, How Many Matching Programs Does the NRMP
Operate?, at, http://www.savethematch.org/faq/all.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2003). Each year,
between thirty and one thousand applicants participate in the various specialty matches. Id.
27. See Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9, at 1-2; Coyle, supra note 24, at Al.
In 2003, the NRMP enrolled 3,719 programs in the Match, which altogether offered 23,365
positions. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, About the NRMP, at http://www.nrmp.org/about-
nrmp/index.html (last modified Aug. 13, 2003). A total of 31,004 applicants participated in the
Match. Id.
28. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9, at 5; see also Complaint, supra note 5,
71 (stating that "[i]n 2000, more than 80% of all first-year residency positions were offered
exclusively through the Matching Program").
29. Coyle, supra note 24. In 1950, there were 5,553 U.S. medical school graduates and
9,398 available first-year residency positions. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9, at
2.
30. Gordon Schnell, An Antitrust Challenge to the National Resident Matching Program,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1, 2002, at 4, WL 8/1/2002 N.Y.L.J. 4. "Even the most prestigious institutions got




2003] IMPROVING MEDICAL RESIDENT PLACEMENT
applicant to accept an offer within a very short period of time, usually
twenty-four to forty-eight hours, or risk having the offer rescinded.
32
According to the American Medical Association, the lack of a
formal system during the pre-NRMP era fostered an "old-boy's
network."33 Students with connections to the medical community had
an advantage over other applicants for the most coveted positions.
34
The NRMP resolves these two problems by ensuring that no student
and hospital can be matched unless both mutually prefer to be
matched. 35 Further, the NRMP was designed to alleviate the pressure
to make premature decisions by prohibiting students and programs
from making a commitment as to how each will be ranked.3 6
2. Match Selection Process
On a specified date every February, fourth-year medical
students submit a confidential list ranking their desired residency
programs to the NRMP.37 On the same date, residency program
directors submit a confidential list ranking the students they prefer. 38
The NRMP then uses the lists to electronically generate a single
assignment for each student.39 The computer first attempts to place
an applicant into her top choice program.40 If the applicant cannot be
matched to this program, due to the hospital's indicated preference for
other candidates, the computer then attempts to place the applicant
into her second choice program. 41 This process continues until the
32. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, Save the Match, FAQ, Why was the Match
Established?, at http://www.savethematch.org/faq/all.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
33. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9, at 2.
34. Id. Side-deals were commonplace, stifling merit-driven competition. Id.
35. See Schnell, supra note 30.
36. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, How the NRMP Process Works, at http://www.nrmp.
org/aboutnrmp/how.html (last modified Aug. 13, 2003).
37. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9, at 3-4.
38. Id.
39. Id.; Coyle, supra note 24; see also Gordon Schnell, Iffy Prognosis for Intern Suit, NAT'L
L.J., June 24-July 1, 2002, at A12 (likening the Match to an "annual computerized mating
dance"), WL 6/24/02 NLJ A12. The results of the Match are then announced nationwide during
the third week in March. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 27.
40. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, How the Matching Algorithm Works?, at
http://www.nrmp.org/resmatch/about.res/algorithms.html (last modified Aug. 13, 2003).
41. Id. The NRMP's algorithm is based on the premise that each applicant should be
matched to the program that she most prefers and that is willing to accept her. Nat'l Resident
Matching Program, Save the Match, How the Match Works, at
http://www.savethematch.org/historyhowworks.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2003). A match can
be achieved when a program has vacant positions that have not yet been filled with other
applicants who desire the same program and whom the program prefers. Id.
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applicant obtains a match or until all of her choices are exhausted. 42
Applicants who fail to receive an assignment participate in a post-
Match "scramble" for unfilled positions.43
3. Binding Nature of the NRMP
The NRMP requires that all parties agree in advance to accept
its results without negotiating employment terms. 44 Prior to entering
the Match, students and programs sign a Match Participation
Agreement that stipulates that a match is a binding commitment. 45
The only way to evade a match is through an NRMP waiver based on
a "serious hardship."46  Failure to honor a match triggers strict
penalties, including program and applicant disqualification from
subsequent matches and applicant classification as a "match violator"
for up to three years.
47
III. EVOLUTION OF THE MEDICAL RESIDENT LABOR RIGHTS MOVEMENT:
42. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, How the Matching Algorithm Works, at
http://www.nrmp.org/res-match/about-res/algorithms.html (last modified Aug. 13, 2003).
43. Unmatched applicants are notified of their status three days prior to the general release
of the Match results. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, Save the Match, How the Match Works,
at http://www.savethematch.org/history/howworks.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2003). During this
scramble period, unmatched applicants work individually to find programs that have unfilled
positions. Id. These applicants generally accept the first offer they receive rather than risk not
receiving an offer from a more preferred program. Id.
44. Complaint, supra note 5, 86.2; Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, Jung v. Association of
American Medical Colleges, ANTITRUST, Q4 2002, at 20-21, http://www.mayerbrown.com/
antitrust/pdf/AntitrustQuarterly2002Q4.pdf; Coyle, supra note 24.
45. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, Match Participation Agreement Among Applicants,
the NRMP, and Participating Programs, § 1.0, at http://www.nrmp.org/res-match/policies/map-
main.html, (last modified Aug. 13, 2003.
46. Id. § 2.5; see Nat'l Resident Matching Program, The Integrity of the NRMP Match, at
http://www.nrmp.org/res-match/about-res/ensuring.html (last modified Aug. 13, 2003). The
NRMP states the following policy:
"Serious hardship" refers to the occurrence of a highly unusual, unexpected,
and unpredictable situation or circumstance that renders the fulfillment of
the Match obligation impossible or would result in irreparable harm to any
one of the committed Match participants. Examples of "serious hardship"
include an applicant who failed to graduate on time; the closing of a program
or institution; the death or serious illness of a family member that requires
the applicant to alter the choice of residency location; or the loss of
accreditation by a program or institution. "Serious hardship" does not
include taking advantage of a more "desirable" choice of a program or
applicant after rank order lists are submitted.
Id.
47. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 45, § 7.2.1. The NRMP reports violations
to the applicant's medical school, the programs included in the applicant's rank list, the NRMP
Executive Committee, and the American Board of Medical Specialties, among others. Id.; see
Complaint, supra note 5, 85, 86.3.
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THE STRUGGLE FOR MORE HUMANE WORKING CONDITIONS
To fully understand Jung's impact on residents and on the
medical community, one must understand the context in which the
case arises. Prior to Jung, residents focused primarily on decreasing
their work hours. 48 On the heels of the Accreditation Council's recent
enactment of hours limitations, residents have now turned their
efforts towards fighting binding matches and low salaries.
For decades, the medical community has extolled the virtues of
this training system, which relies on residents as an abundant source
of cheap labor.49 Observers outside the medical community refer to
residents as the "last indentured servants of the modern age."50 Some
medical residents find these work conditions oppressive and demand a
change in the status quo. In a survey conducted by the Journal of the
American Medical Association designed to examine the residency
experience, researchers found that 93% of residents surveyed
experienced at least one incident of perceived mistreatment, with 53%
reporting being belittled or humiliated by more senior physicians. 51 In
the same study, 70% of residents reported witnessing colleagues
working in an impaired condition, most often due to lack of sleep. 52
Residents and the medical establishment now find themselves
engaged in a heated power struggle implicating Congress, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and, most
recently, the federal court system.
A. The Regulatory Initiative: Fighting for the Right to Unionize
In an attempt to improve their working conditions through
negotiations, residents sought unionization rights from OSHA. Under
the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),53 a group of employees
48. See generally Dori Page Antonetti, Note, A Dose of Their Own Medicine: Why the
Federal Government Must Ensure Healthy Working Conditions for Medical Residents and How
Reform Should Be Accomplished, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 875 (2002) (advocating work-hour
limitations for medical residents); Coyle, supra note 24.
49. Cohen, supra note 7.
50. Id. Until recently, residency programs have routinely required up to one hundred hours
of work per week, including thirty-six and forty-eight hour uninterrupted on-call shifts.
Antonetti, supra note 48, at 876; Coyle, supra note 24..
51. Steven R. Daugherty et al., Learning, Satisfaction, and Mistreatment During Medical
Internship: A National Survey of Working Conditions, 279 JAMA 1194, 1196 (Apr. 15, 1998).
52. Id. at 1197.
53. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000). Section 151 states the following policy:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
1447
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can form a bargaining unit only after formal recognition from the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).54 Presumably, forming a
union would provide residents with the necessary leverage to prompt
workplace reforms. 5  After rejecting two attempts to gain such
recognition,5 6 the NLRB, in 1999, finally acknowledged residents'
right to unionize.57  In doing so, the NLRB uniquely classified
residents as both students and employees. 58 Granting the right to
unionize spurred a move toward a more humane approach for training
residents and a move away from the notion that residency is a form of
professional hazing.59  Indeed, the NLRB acknowledged that,
"[a]lthough essential to the training of a physician, an internship,
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection.
§ 151.
54. See Eva M. Panchyshyn, Comment, Medical Resident Unionization: Collective
Bargaining by Non-Employees for Better Patient Care, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 111, 115 (1998).
To organize under the NLRA, the union that represents the group of employees files a petition
for an election with one of the Board's regional offices. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 159). The regional
director then investigates the petition to determine whether the group of employees is an
appropriate "unit." Id. The factors considered in making this determination include a
community of interests among the employees in the proposed unit, the bargaining history in the
business, and the relationship between the employer's business and the proposed unit. Id.
55. In 1976, medical interns, residents, and clinical fellows at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
led the unionization movement by filing a petition under section 9(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, asking that residents be recognized as a labor unit. Id.
56. Id. at 116-17 (citing Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976) and St.
Clare's Hosp. and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977)). In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, the
NLRB ruled that medical residents were not "employees" within the meaning of the NLRA
because "although they possess certain employee characteristics, [they] are primarily students."
Id. at 117 (citing Cedars-Sinai Medical Center 223 N.L.R.B. at 251 (denying medical residents
certification as a labor organization)).
57. See Jack E. Karns, Note, The National Labor Relations Board Defines "Medical
Employee" Under the Wagner Act Regarding Residents and Interns Thereby Opening the Door to
Unionization and Collective Bargaining Demands, 77 N.D. L. REV. 53, 55-56 (2001) (citing Boston
Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 152 (1999)). "In Boston Medical Center Corp., the majority
held that the petitioner house staff were employees within the context of the NLRA and entitled
to its protection." Id. at 55 n.27.
58. In Boston Medical Center Corp., in a 3-2 decision, the NLRB reversed its previous
decisions that denied residents unionization rights, declaring that residents are employees as
well as students. See Prof'l Students, 158 N.J. L.J. 958, 958 (1999). Thus, residents at both
public and private hospitals are now authorized to form labor unions to collectively bargain for
wages, hours and working conditions. Id.
59. See Karns, supra note 57, at 57-58 (noting that the Boston Medical Center Corp. ruling
is not just a legal decision but also has severe social policy overtones). Karns points out that the
mere fact that residents have been mistreated for twenty years, pursuant to NLRB precedent,
underscores the legal and humane need to change the law. Id. at 69.
1448
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residency or fellowship is not just an academic exercise." 60 This ruling
reflects a more realistic assessment of the important role that
residents play in the administration of patient care.
61
B. The Legislative Initiative: Limiting Resident Work Hours
While a notable victory, unionization proved to be largely
symbolic as it failed to produce limits on the infamous hundred-hour
work week.62 In 2001, the American Medical Student Association and
the Committee of Interns and Residents filed a petition with OSHA
requesting restrictions on resident work hours. 63 When OSHA denied
the petition in 2002, medical professionals enlisted the help of
legislators to reform the structure of residency programs. 64 Driven by
growing public awareness and concern over resident working hours
and conditions,65 a congressional movement to regulate hours gained
significant support in the House of Representatives. 66
60. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. at 164.
61. Prof'l Students, 158 N.J. L.J. at 958.
62. Unionization is not widespread, despite the fact that the ruling affected an estimated
90,000 resident physicians. Coyle, supra note 24. One of the greatest reasons that residents may
be reluctant to organize is the power that chiefs of residency programs exert over residents'
future careers. Id. Residents who wish to pursue a fellowship for further training need a
recommendation from their program chief, who would almost undoubtedly frown upon a squeaky
wheel resident. Id. So, although unionization was an important symbolic victory, it has not
proven to be a comprehensive solution to the problem. Id.
63. Residents filed the petition on April 30, 2001, based on data linking long work hours to
depression, adverse pregnancy outcomes, and motor vehicle crashes. Press Release, Public
Citizen, OSHA Denies Petition to Reduce Work Hours for Doctors-in-Training (Oct. 10, 2002), at
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=1239. The petition recommended that no
physician be permitted to work more than eighty hours per week or more than twenty-four
consecutive hours in one shift. Id. Noting a dangerous incentive to work employees around the
clock, which jeopardizes their safety as well as that of the public, the petition analogized the
need for federal regulation of the medical workplace to the need for federal regulation of
railroads, airlines, motor carriers, and maritime crews. Antonetti, supra note 48, at 906. The
petition also included more stringent restrictions for residents working in busy emergency
medicine units and requested that OSHA investigate whether more restrictive standards should
be implemented. Id. To enforce the proposed restrictions, the petition requested that OSHA
require hospitals to keep public records of resident work schedules, conduct unannounced and
recurrent inspections, and to impose fines substantial enough to deter future violations. Id.
64. Antonetti, supra note 48, at 878.
65. In recent years, the mass media has begun to highlight the negative aspects of harsh
working conditions both on resident health and patient safety. See id. at 878 n.9 (citing various
TV shows).
66. In an effort to improve the working conditions of medical residents, Representative
John Conyers (D-Mich.) drafted the Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act (PPSPA)
containing hours-of-service limitations identical to those requested in Public Citizen's Petition to
OSHA. The proposed bill would amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to ensure the safety
of patients and resident-physicians. H.R. 3236, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001); see Antonetti, supra
note 48, at 907; American College of Surgeons, ACS Views on Legislative, Regulatory, and other
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1439
Prompted by the threat of onerous congressional regulation,
the Accreditation Council finally adopted limits on work schedules for
medical residents in June 2002.67 The new guidelines, which took
effect in 2003, limit residents to an eighty-hour work week, allow
residents to be on call for only twenty-four hour periods, and require
hospitals to provide residents with at least ten hours of rest between
the times that each resident is on call. 68 The Accreditation Council's
acknowledgment that work hours must be limited is a step in the right
direction but more reforms are needed.
C. The Legal Initiative: Landmark Challenge to the NRMP
Medical residents continue to lack the competitive employment
terms that a free labor market offers. As a result, on May 7, 2002,
three former residents filed a class action complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the
NRMP violates antitrust laws.69 According to Dr. Paul Jung, a lead
plaintiff, the suit was filed to ensure that "every student in the
country has a say in their residency program, in their salaries and
working conditions."70 Dr. Jung calls it a "fairness issue" in that one
can apply to different employers but there is not choice at all for
Issues, Resident Work Hours, at http://www.facs.org/ahp/views/gme.html (last updated Nov. 12,
2002). The bill establishes guidelines for resident supervision and includes enforcement
mechanisms with significant fines for violators. Id. As of November 2002, seventy-one members
of the House of Representatives had cosponsored the legislation. Id. Companion legislation,
Sentate Bill 2614, was then introduced in the Senate by Senator Jon Corzine (D-N.J.). Id.
Officials with the American Medical Student Association have said that the rumblings on
Capital Hill forced the Accreditation Council to act on an issue that has received "scant
attention" for decades. Romano, supra note 14. Commentators view the PPSPA more favorably
than the unsuccessful OSHA petition because the bill is aimed at safeguarding patients, with
resident protections as an ancillary bonus. Antonetti, supra note 48, at 913-14. Thus, they
believe that the proposed legislation has a greater chance of acceptance by the medical
community since doctors are trained to do what is best for their patients. Id. at 914.
67. Romano, supra note 14. The Accreditation Council cites its primary purpose as
'residents' medical education" but is quick to point out that "[w]e are also very sensitive to
patient safety." Id. (quoting David Leach, M.D., executive director of the Chicago-based
Accreditation Council).
68. Id. Violating hospitals will be stripped of their accreditation, a penalty that could result
in the withdrawal of federal funding, or as much as $100 million per year in the case of a major
academic medical center. Id.; see also Katherine S. Mangan, Facing Loss of Accreditation, Yale
Reduces Workweek of Surgery Residents, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 6, 2002 (discussing the
case of Yale University Medical Center, whose violations of work hour limitations threatened its
program's accreditation), quoted in Am. Med. Ass'n, Report F (I-02): Resident/Fellow Work and
Learning Environment app. C, at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/16/repfiO2.doc
(last visited Sept. 1, 2003).
69. Complaint, supra note 5; see also Schnell, supra note 39; Coyle, supra note 24.
70. AAIM, Residents File Lawsuit Against NRMP (May 10, 2002), at http://www.im.org/
AAIMIPublicPolicy/MerlinArchive/May2002.htm.
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residency programs. 71 The following part will discuss the legal issues
surrounding this controversial case, analyze the arguments on both
sides, and reach a conclusion as to the expected outcome.
IV. JUNG MAY TAKE SCALPEL TO THE NRMP
The suit alleges that the NRMP, by its nature, eliminates a
"free and competitive [job] market," which makes the NRMP
anticompetitive and illegal under antitrust law. 72 Although plaintiffs
allege three separate antitrust violations, 73 this Note will focus only on
the challenge to the NRMP. With regard to the NRMP, the suit
charges that defendants violate section one of the Sherman Antitrust
Act (Sherman Act) by "illegally contracting, combining, and conspiring
to eliminate competition in the recruitment, hiring, employment, and
compensation of student physicians." 74 The complaint states that the
alleged restraints "fix, artificially depress, standardize and stabilize
resident compensation and terms of employment." 75 Specifically,
plaintiffs claim that the NRMP has the anticompetitive purpose 76 and
effect 77 of restricting residents' job search attempts and eliminating
individual employment negotiations.78 This inability to negotiate
allegedly forces incoming residents to accept less compensation than
they would receive in a competitive job market. 79
There are three named plaintiffs in the case, each of whom
obtained his or her residency position through the NRMP.80 The
71. Id.
72. Complaint, supra note 5, 9 83.
73. Plaintiffs allege that defendants' illegal combination and conspiracy has restrained
competition in the employment of residents by 1) stabilizing wages below competitive levels
through the exchange of information regarding resident compensation and terms of employment,
2) eliminating competition in the recruitment and employment of residents by assigning
residents' positions through the Matching Program and 3) establishing and complying with
anticompetitive accreditation standards of the Accreditation Council (ACGME). Id 9 3.
74. Id. 9 2, 83, 98-99; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).




79. See id. 9 83, 84.
80. The three named plaintiffs are Paul Jung, M.D., Luis Llerena, M.D., and Denise
Greene, M.D. Memorandum from Jordan J. Cohen, M.D., of the Association of American Medical
Colleges 1 (Aug. 15, 2002), at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/jungcomplaint/memo02.26.pdf. Dr.
Paul Jung completed a three-year residency program in 2000 at Metro Health Medical Center in
Cleveland, Ohio. Id. At the time the complaint was filed, he was a Robert Wood Johnson
Clinical Scholar at the Johns Hopkins University. Id. At the time the complaint was filed, Dr.
Luis Llerena was a sixth-year resident working in a two-year fellowship program at Orlando
Regional Medical Center. Id. Previously, he completed a five-year residency program at Cooper
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defendants are divided into two categories: "organization defendants"
and "institution defendants."81 The "organization defendants" include
the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), the NRMP, the
Accreditation Council, the American Hospital Association (AHA), the
American Medical Association (AMA), the American Board of Medical
Specialties (ABMS), and the Council of Medical Specialty Societies
(CMSS).8 2  The "institution defendants" include twenty-nine
hospitals8 3 that sponsor medical residency programs.
8 4
A. Fundamentals of an Antitrust Inquiry
Section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits "[e]very
contract, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade."' 5 Thus,
an antitrust plaintiff must show that the defendants entered into a
collective agreement that unreasonably restrains trade.8 6  The
agreement need not be formal or express but can be satisfied merely
by showing a meeting of the minds to engage in anticompetitive
Hospital in Camden, New Jersey, after spending three years in a residency program at MCP
Hahnemann Hospital in Philadelphia. Id. At the time the complaint was filed, Dr. Denise
Greene was in her fourth year of a five-year residency program at the University of California-
Davis. Id.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. These "organization defendants" either manage (AAMC) or sponsor (ACGME, AHA,
AMA, ABMS, CMSS) the NRMP. Id. at 3.
83. The twenty-nine hospitals named as defendants are as follows: Medstar-Georgetown
Hospital Medical Center, Inc.; George Washington University; Medstar Health, Inc.;
Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund; Barnes-Jewish Hospital; Baylor College of
Medicine; Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc.; Beth Israel Medical Center; Boston
Medical Center Corp.; Cedars-Sinai Medical Center; The Cleveland Clinic Foundation; Duke
University Health System, Inc.; Emory University; Henry Ford Health System; The
Massachusetts General Hospital; The McGaw Medical Center of Northwestern University; The
Mount Sinai School of Medicine of the City University of New York; The New York and
Presbyterian Hospital; Rhode Island Hospital; Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center; St.
Louis University; Stanford Hospital and Clinics; Strong Memorial Hospital of the University of
Rochester; Thomas Jefferson Hospital, Inc.; University Hospitals of Cleveland, Inc.; Washington
University Medical Center; William Beaumont Hospital; Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc.; Yeshiva
University. Complaint, supra note 5.
84. Memorandum from Jordan J. Cohen, M.D., supra note 80, at 2.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2002).
86. Literally applied, section one would outlaw every contract restraining trade, since every
commercial contract restrains trade in some way. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of
Trade § 47 (2003) (citing Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) and
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 49 (1911)). Nonetheless, section one has been
construed by the Supreme Court to ban only those contracts that constitute unreasonable
restraints of competition. Id. (citing Business Electronic Corp., v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 723 (1988), where the Court stated that "[slince the earliest decisions of this Court
interpreting this provision, we have recognized that it was intended to prohibit only
unreasonable restraints of trade).
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conduct.8 7 Once an agreement is established, whether the agreement
unreasonably restrains trade will be analyzed either under the rule of
per se invalidity or under the rule of reason.88
Restraints whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the relevant industry is
required are deemed illegal per se.8 9 Since a practice constituting a
per se violation is conclusively presumed to be unreasonable, a court
facing such a restraint looks only to see whether the defendant
actually engaged in the conduct alleged.90 In determining whether a
particular activity justifies per se treatment, the critical question is
whether the activity historically and consistently restricts
competition, thereby making the market less competitive and less
efficient. 91 As a general rule, an activity will be deemed a per se
violation only after the courts have had considerable experience with
the challenged conduct such that any prior application of the rule of
reasons inevitably resulted in a finding of anticompetitive effects. 92
Traditionally, courts have held that any agreement between
competitors to stabilize prices constitutes a per se violation of section
one.93 Horizontal price fixing, as defined by common law, occurs when
direct competitors get together to set either maximum 94 or minimum
95
87. Absent an express or formal agreement to engage in anticompetitive conduct, a plaintiff
may establish an unlawful combination by present circumstantial evidence showing a unity of
purpose among the defendants. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 40 (2003).
A tacit agreement, also called "conscious parallelism," must be accompanied by "plus" factors
that indicate the absence of independent action. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of
Trade § 41 (2003). The concerted action element of a section one claim also includes proof of an
unlawful objective. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 32 (2003).
88. See James F. Blumstein & Frank Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital Peer Review, 51 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 53-54 (1988) (outlining the differences between per se treatment and the
rule of reason analysis).
89. Robert H. Jerry, II & Donald E. Knebel, Antitrust and Employer Restraints in Labor
Markets, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 173, 176 (1984); see AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade
§ 50 (2003) (outlining the doctrine of per se illegality).
90. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 50 (2003).
91. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 51 (2003).
92. Id. The doctrine of per se illegality applies only to historically anticompetitive conduct
where judicial and administrative resources would be wasted by the repetition of a competitive
analysis. Id. Practices which have been conclusively deemed illegal per se include price fixing
arrangements, tying arrangements, agreements among competitors to divide markets or allocate
customers, group boycotts, and agreements to limit production. Id.
93. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (194) (holding that "a
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate . . . commerce is illegal per se."). See also
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (holding that it is no defense
that a fixed price is reasonable since the reasonable price fixed today may become unreasonable
tomorrow).
94. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 332 (1982) (holding that an
agreement between doctors and insurers fixing maximum prices for the doctors' services was
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prices for a product or service. An agreement that restricts a
competitor's ability to set a price based on his own judgment will
constitute a horizontal price fix. 96 For example, the elimination of
competitive bidding has historically been deemed illegal per se even
where prices were not expressly fixed. 97 Horizontal restraints have
the greatest chance of seriously limiting or eliminating competition in
the marketplace. As such, antitrust law considers them most
egregious. 98
Per se treatment precludes any defense that the price fixed was
reasonable99  or that adherence to the fixed price was not
mandatory.100 A horizontal price fix may be considered appropriate
only when an agreement to fix prices is necessary to make the product
available at all.101
Restraints that are not illegal per se are evaluated by
analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the
restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed so as to determine its
anticompetitive effect.10 2  Courts apply the rule of reason if the
purpose or effect of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct is unclear or
if the court is unfamiliar with the agreement at issue.10 3 A rule of
reason analysis essentially balances the harms of the allegedly
illegal per se). Even though competitors are free to price at below the maximum, the presence of
the ceiling tends to stabilize prices and distort resource allocation. Id.
95. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 773 (1975) (holding that a minimum fee
schedule adopted by the bar association violated section one of the Sherman Act).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-95 (1978)
(holding per se illegal a trade association's canon of ethics that prohibited competitive bidding by
its members).
98. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 75 (2003) (stating that an
agreement among competitors is the "archetypal example of a practice that is so plainly
anticompetitive and so often lacking any redeeming virtue that it is conclusively presumed
illegal").
99. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211, 238 (1899) (holding pipe
manufacturers' price schedule illegal per se despite any defense that the prices fixed were
reasonable and meant to benefit consumers).
100. United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 399 U.S. 485, 488-90 (1950) (holding
that a real estate board's establishment of a suggested price schedule was per se illegal even
where members were not required to adhere to the schedule and where no penalties were
imposed for noncompliance).
101. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1979) (holding that
use of a blanket licensing agreement was not illegal per se because such a license was necessary
to make the product available in the first place).
102. Jerry & Knebel, supra note 89, at 176.
103. See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 3 (holding that a blanket licensing agreement, which
forced a user of ASCAP's copyrighted music to purchase a blanket license for use of all ASCAP's
music, required rule of reason treatment because such a horizontal restraint was necessary to
make the product available in the first place); 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade
§ 48 (2003) (outlining the rule of reason standard).
2003] IMPROVING MEDICAL RESIDENT PLACEMENT
anticompetitive conduct against its procompetitive benefits to
determine the net effect on competition. 10 4 Courts will not inquire into
whether the impairment of competition may actually be in the best
interests of a specific industry. This is because the Sherman Act
reflects a legislative judgment that competition is the best method of
allocating resources in a free market. 10 5
Applying the rule of reason entails a somewhat imprecise
assessment of the facts peculiar to the challenged business. 106 While
the reasonableness of restraint is necessarily a question of relation
and degree, courts analyzing allegedly anticompetitive conduct
generally focus on 1) the market conditions before and after the
restraint was imposed, 2) the purpose and motivation for the
restraint, and 3) the nature and effect of the challenged conduct.107
A court considers market conditions to determine whether the
parties who have reached an agreement have a sufficient amount of
market power to restrain trade in the market at issue. 08 Market
power is the ability to independently influence the price of a product
by restricting its output. The defendant[s] must have the ability to
raise prices without incurring a critical loss of sales.10 9 Without this
power, the agreement has an insignificant effect on the market and
does not provoke governmental concern. 10  Courts consider the
motivation of a restraint by inquiring into its history, duration, and
stated purpose."1 To that end, a plaintiff may present evidence of a
104. Jerry & Knebel, supra note 89, at 175-76. "In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,
Justice Brandeis observed that the broad language of section one, if applied literally, would
invalidate every contract." Id. at 175-76. Thus, the Supreme Court historically follows a rule of
reason analysis to determine whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes or
suppresses competition. Id. at 176.
105. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Note, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1767-68 (1994). The Sherman Act reflects
Congress' judgment that "competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free
market." Jerry & Knebel, supra note 89, at 175 (citing National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. at 695). The efficient allocation of resources enhances
consumer welfare because competition lowers prices and results in better goods and services. Id.
106. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 48 (2003).
107. See, e.g., 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 48 (2003); Blumstein &
Sloan, supra note 88, at 86-88.
108. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 49 (2003)
109. Without market power, consumers can shop around to find a rivaling better deal. Id. at
n. 87.
110. When a given product has significant substitutes or alternatives readily available, the
risk to competition from any one entity taking action is low. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 88,
at 87. As alternatives become less accessible, less attractive, or otherwise more costly, the
potential adverse impact on competition is higher and the antitrust defendant must justify his
actions by showing their procompetitive effects. Id.
111. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 48 (2003).
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defendant's anticompetitive motivation or bad faith. Behavior that is
seemingly consistent with anticompetitive animus will be viewed more
harshly if a plaintiff can show there is little likelihood that the
conduct was entered into for procompetitive reasons. 112 The essence of
a rule of reason inquiry is to identify the true effect of an agreement.
To violate the antitrust laws, the agreement at issue must be
anticompetitive; it must unreasonably restrain competition.
113
B. Residents'Burden of Proof
As threshold issues, the plaintiffs must show collective conduct
on the part of the defendants and the implication of interstate
commerce. 114 The plaintiff residents likely meet both requirements.
First, the organization and institution defendants act together to
administer the Match. Specifically, the organization defendants
engaged in collective conduct by establishing and maintaining the
NRMP.11 5 The institution defendants then act collectively by using
the NRMP as a means to fill their respective residency programs. 1 6
Second, both the organization and institution defendants meet the low
burden required to bring them within federal regulation since both
participate in interstate commerce.11 7
The residents allege that defendant hospitals, which compete
with each other for residents, set horizontal restraints that
circumvent fair compensation. Yet, the Jung court will most likely
reject mechanical per se treatment because the restraint at issue is a




115. See Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 23 (listing sponsors of the NRMP).
116. See Complaint, supra note 5, 83-89.
117. The institution defendants participate in interstate commerce by inviting prospective
candidates to cross state lines to interview for employment positions, receiving millions of dollars
from out-of-state sources, and purchasing goods and services from out-of-state parties.
Complaint, supra note 5, 66. Further, both the organization and institution defendants
communicate with each other and their professional organizations using interstate
communications networks, the Internet, and the United States mail. Id. Congress has broad
authority to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3; see 15 AM. JUR. 2D
Commerce § 18 (2000).
118. See Schnell, supra note 39. The NRMP's redeeming virtues include the efficiency of a
central placement system with one deadline and one Match Day. See supra Part II.B.
(discussing the reasons for the current NRMP).
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Furthermore, most courts will not apply per se treatment to practices
involving education or the professions. 119
Therefore, the Jung court will analyze the Match under the
rule of reason. To determine whether the NRMP has a net pro- or
anticompetitive effect, the court will consider the condition of the
resident labor market before and after the NRMP was instituted, the
motivation for creating the NRMP, and the nature and effect of the
NRMP to determine whether the NRMP has a net pro- or
anticompetitive effect.
1. Market Conditions
Before the NRMP, medical students obtained residency
positions through the open job market. 120 Some members of the
medical community describe the former process, which is akin to the
current "scramble," as "chaotic, inefficient and inhumane."121 Without
question, the NRMP's centralized application process has created
structural efficiencies in the market for resident services.1 22 However,
these efficiencies may indirectly thwart interprogram wage
competition because the NRMP requires applicants to accept a single
binding match without the option to entertain a competing offer.123
Moreover, the Jung defendants undoubtedly possess significant
power within the relevant market,1 24 defined as the services of
resident physicians in accredited residency programs across the
United States. 125 The NRMP is the primary route by which applicants
119. The Court has been wary of condemning rules adopted by professional associations as
unreasonable per se because they observe that certain types of restrictive activities may be pro-
competitive in operation. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 88, at 27-28. The primary justification
for increased reliance on the rule of reason analysis is the Court's growing sense that some types
of superficially restrictive conduct may, overall, have a positive effect on competition. Id.
120. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9, at 2; see Part I1B..1.
121. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, Save the Match, Why the NRMP's History is
Relevant, at http://www.savethematch.org/history/history.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
122. See infra Part V.B.
123. See supra Part II.B.
124. The relevant market consists of two components: the relevant geographic market and
the relevant product market. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 57 (2003).
The relevant geographic market is defined by the area in which the defendant can sell the
product or service. Id. The relevant product market is determined by consumer preferences and
the extent to which the product or service is reasonably interchangeable. Id. In this case, the
relevant geographic market is the United States. Complaint, supra note 5, 67. The relevant
product market consists of the market for services of resident physicians in ACGME-accredited
residency programs (including programs combined of ACGME-accredited programs and
subspecialty programs commonly referred to as fellowships). Id. 68.
125. Complaint, supra note 5, 67-68.
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obtain positions in accredited residency programs. 26 The practical
effect is that there are no viable substitutes or alternatives to the
NRMP. Ultimately, the court must weigh the advantage of the
NRMP's efficiencies against the disadvantage of a single entity
administering resident job placement.
2. Motivation
The Jung plaintiffs likely will not prove that the NRMP was
established with bad intentions. 127 The stated purpose of the NRMP
was to organize a previously chaotic process. 128 Even so, the residents
may be able to argue successfully that despite the program's altruistic
beginning, the defendants have, over time, demonstrated bad faith by
refining the program to "strengthen and expand its anticompetitive
effect ... ,"129 Establishing withdrawal deadlines for programs and
applicants,1 30 as well as developing a policing system for match
violations, 131 could be viewed as conduct intended to maintain the
restrictiveness of the NRMP. If residents can show that these changes
to the structure of the matching process were made with
anticompetitive motivations, they will certainly strengthen their case
against defendants.
Both the organization and institution defendants have a history
of conduct that appears to violate antitrust laws. 32  Specifically, the
residents point to three incidents in support of this contention. 133
First, in 1996, the United States Department of Justice investigated
126. Id. 71; see also supra Part II.B (stating that on average each year, more than 92% of
United States medical school seniors obtain their first-year residency positions through the
Match). Furthermore, 100% of residency positions in the United States are subject to the
ACGME's accreditation standards. Complaint, supra note 5, 71.
127. See generally Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9. The Match was
instituted to take pressure off of students and bring organization to a previously chaotic process.
Contra Complaint, supra note 5, 84 (arguing that "[t]he anticompetitive purpose and effect of
the Matching Program is revealed in its genesis").
128. See generally Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9. The Match was
instituted to take pressure off of students and bring organization to a previously chaotic process.
Contra Complaint, supra note 5, 1 84 (arguing that "[t]he anticompetitive purpose and effect of
the Matching Program is revealed in its genesis").
129. See Complaint, supra note 5, 85.
130. Id. 7 85. Withdrawal deadlines were changed to more effectively prevent employers
from entering into "side-deals" with applicants and then withdrawing corresponding positions
from the NRMP before they were filled. Id.
131. Id. The NRMP developed systems for reporting match violations to the respective
specialty certification board that will ultimately decide an applicant's request for certification.
Id. Additionally, a resident who declines a match and obtains alternative employment may be
subject to dismissal if his employer learns of the match violation. Id.
132. Id. 89-91.
133. Id. I 89-91.
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the Association of Family Practice Residency Directors because the
Association allegedly conspired to restrain competition among family
practice residency programs by promulgating guidelines that limited
recruitment practices and the payment of certain kinds of economic
incentives to prospective residents. 134 Under a subsequent consent
decree, 3 5 the Association was required to withdraw the challenged
guidelines and prohibited from promulgating similar rules in the
future.13
6
Second, plaintiffs note three cases of price fixing involving
physicians' fees and nurses' salaries. 137 Finally, the residents cite
instances where the medical establishment boycotted the services of
competing professions including podiatrists, psychologists,
chiropractors, osteopathic physicians, and nurse-midwives. 138 These
instances evidence a pattern of anticompetitive conduct within the
medical establishment.
3. Nature and Effect of the NRMP
The NRMP consists of agreements between the defendant
hospitals and professional associations. 139  The organization
defendants provide the NRMP to the institution defendants who agree
to use it to fill their first-year resident positions.1 40 By its nature, the
134. Id. 89 (citing United States v. Assoc. of Family Practice Residency Directors, 1996 WL
557841 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 15, 1996)).
135. A consent decree is the antitrust equivalent to a cease and desist order. 54 AM. JUR. 2D
Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 572 (1996). A consent decree prohibits the continuation of
claimed illegal conduct and circumvents a time-consuming and expensive trial by setting forth
an adequate remedy if its terms are violated. Id.
136. Justice Department Moves to Stop Anticompetitive Actions of National Medical
Residency Trade Association, NAT'L ASS'N ATT'Ys GEN., May/June 1996, at 22, 23; see Assoc. of
Family Practice Residency Dirs., 1996 WL 557841, at *1-2.
137. See United States v. Utah Soc'y for Healthcare Human Resources Admin., 1994 WL
729931 (D. Utah Sept. 14, 1994) (fixing nurses' salaries); Mich. State Med. Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191
(Feb. 17, 1983) (Final order; fixing physicians' fees); Complaint, supra note 5, 90 (citing
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (fixing physicians' fees).
138. Complaint, supra note 5, 91; see, e.g., Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465
(1982) (psychologists); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990) (chiropractors);
Hahn v. Or. Physician's Serv., 86 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1989) (podiatrists); Weiss v. York Hosp.,
745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984) (osteopathic physicians); Sweeney v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., 709 F.
Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (nurse-midwives).
139. See generally Nat'l Resident Mathcing Program, Match Participation Agreement for
Institutions (displaying the Match Participation Agreement Between Participating Institutions
and the NRMP), at http://www.nrmp.org/res-match/policies/map-institution.html (last modified
Aug. 13, 2003).
140. See id. § 1.0. "Institutions that register any programs in the Matching Program agree
to select senior students of U.S. allopathic medical schools for all of their programs only through
the Matching Program." Id.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
current NRMP constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade because
its mandatory participation rule gives competing programs the ability
to collectively set resident salaries.14 ' So long as each program
adheres to the narrow salary range, hospitals can avoid wage bidding
and still be assured of gaining their preferred candidates, who must
accept the single placement they receive.
142
Whether or not the NRMP unreasonably restrains trade by its
nature, its effect is anticompetitive in at least three ways. First,
fourth-year medical students planning to enter a residency essentially
must participate in the Match.' 43 Second, the NRMP removes an
applicant's choice to accept or decline the Match placement.144
Finally, the NRMP structure effectively eliminates individual
negotiations between applicants and programs because students are
required to accept the placement they receive. 45 The combined effect
of these factors is to suppress interprogram wage competition by
giving hospitals a captive group of incoming employees.
C. Justification for the NRMP
If the Jung plaintiffs successfully show anticompetitive conduct
that suppresses wage competition, the defendants must show that the
procompetitive virtues of the NRMP outweigh its anticompetitive
effect. The defendants must utilize accepted antitrust defenses to
avoid liability. The tendency by courts to view noncommercial conduct
with greater leniency under antitrust laws weighs heavily in the
defendants' favor. 146 Nevertheless, each relevant defense will likely
fail, resulting in a legal victory for the plaintiffs.
As a threshold matter, defendants may argue that the Sherman
Act does not apply to employer restraints in labor markets. 147 Some
legal scholars suggest that practices in labor markets come under
141. See id.; Complaint, supra note 5 83.
142. See supra Part I.B.3.
143. Since a student's goal in pursuing a residency is to become an accredited practitioner,
she is limited to a position at an accredited program. Over 80% of such positions are offered
exclusively through the NRMP. Complaint, supra note 5, 71. Student applicants are further
compelled to use the Match because residency programs that opt to participate in the NRMP are
largely prohibited from choosing candidates outside the Match. Id. 86.1.
144. Pursuant to NRMP rules, both prospective residents and programs agree in advance to
be bound by the Match. See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 24; Jenny B. Davis, Disturbing Diagnosis:
Physician Residents Sue Their System for Antitrust, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, May 10, 2002, at 2, WL
1 No. 18 ABAJERPT 2; AAIM, supra note 70; supra Part II.B.3.
145. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 5, 86.2; see infra Part V.B. (discussing absence of
individual negotiations between candidates and programs).
146. Schnell, supra note 39, at A12.
147. See Jerry & Knebel, supra note 89, at 246.
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antitrust scrutiny only if they adversely affect competition in the
product market. 148 The plaintiffs' decision to sue under antitrust law
will force a court to decide whether the Sherman Act protects
competition in labor markets as well as in product markets.' 49 Several
scholars have argued that section one does not regulate concerted
employer conduct that restrains only the labor market, pointing to the
legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of
the Sherman Act as evidence that employer restraints are illegal only
if they have direct or indirect consequences on the product market.
150
Thus, when employees challenge concerted employer conduct in a
particular labor market, they must show that the labor market
restraint is intended to affect, or actually does affect, a product
market.151 Since employer attempts to restrain labor costs may
actually benefit consumers in the form of lower prices, it may be
difficult to argue that anticompetitive labor restraints adversely affect
the product market.152
148. See id. at 174.
149. See Jerry & Knebel, supra note 89, at 173-74 (highlighting the debate over the scope of
federal antitrust laws as applied to restraints in labor markets).
150. It is inappropriate and contrary to the Act's purpose to use the Sherman Act to promote
efficiency in the labor market. Id. at 183. See generally id. at 184-92 (providing the legislative
history of section one of the Sherman Act). "[Tlhe legislative history of the Sherman Act does not
support the proposition that Congress intended [it] to be used to regulate employer competition
in labor markets." Id. at 184. "[Senator John] Sherman [of Ohio] saw federal antitrust
legislation as a solution for the depression of wages by trusts, not because his bill had any
applicability to labor markets, but because his bill would promote competition in markets for
goods and services." Id. at 188. The product market is "the commercial market where firms sell
their goods and services." Id. at 174.
151. Id. at 180-81. The scope of the Sherman Act is of crucial significance to employee
plaintiffs who challenge multiemployer activity restraining labor markets. Id. at 182. Jerry and
Knebel further note that when multiple employers unilaterally restrain the labor market, the
employees' principal grievance is likely to be a wage reduction, stabilization, or depression. Id.
at 180. However, "[a] plaintiff who challenges a multiemployer labor market restraint on the
ground that it has depressed wages or otherwise affected conditions of employment fails to state
a Sherman Act claim." Id. at 241.
152. See id. at 181-82.
In an economic sense, any change in the cost of producing a product can be
said to have some influence upon that product's price. If price is defined as
the cost of production plus a reasonable profit, then decreasing the cost of one
input to the product will permit the firm either to decrease price without
decreasing profit or to increase profit without increasing price. Thus, if
employers conspire to prevent wages from rising above a certain level,
employers can either decrease prices without decreasing profits or increase
profits without increasing prices. A change in a production cost may not
result in a price change, but it has relationship to, and can be said to affect,
price.
Id. "If rising labor costs are restrained, the consumer may benefit from a stable or more slowly
increasing price." Id. at 182.
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Notwithstanding that no court has ruled directly on the issue
of restraints in the professional labor market, 153 a court will likely
conclude that the Sherman Act does regulate labor markets. Even
those who support excluding labor markets from the protections of the
Sherman Act concede that the judiciary's willingness to scrutinize
restraints in professional athletics suggests that a court will conclude
that the Sherman Act applies to professional labor markets. 
154
Like professional athletics, the hospital industry relies heavily
upon individual practitioners who come together as a team. A
hospital's sole product is its medical services. Without question, the
value of these services depends entirely on the ability of resident
doctors and support staff to provide quality medical care. It is difficult
to imagine how a restraint on competition for physician services would
not negatively affect a hospital's product market since a hospital's
product is its services. For this reason, the Jung court will most likely
classify medical residents as independent contractors selling
professional services in product markets, 155 thus bringing them under
the ambit of section one of the Sherman Act.
1. Procompetitive Justifications
Defendants will likely argue that the NRMP is procompetitive
because it 1) brings efficiency and fairness to a previously chaotic
process; 2) optimizes the preferences of the participating medical
students and hospitals; 3) allows students to make more educated
decisions about what specialties they wish to pursue; 4) minimizes
disruption on medical school; 5) increases the supply of residents; 6)
improves the caliber of resident training; and 7) improves the overall
quality of healthcare in the United States. 156 While clearly beneficial
from a practical perspective, these justifications are unlikely to be
considered procompetitive. Assuming arguendo that the benefits are
153. See id. at 237 (stating that the most prominent cases relating to professional labor
services involve restraints in professional athletics where athletes have frequently challenged
employer-imposed restraints, such as player drafts and free agent rules, as combinations
condemned by antitrust laws).
154. For example, courts reviewing cases involving professional sports have consistently
applied section one protections, reasoning that teams sell to the public the services of their
players. Id. at 238. Since the service supplied to the public is highly dependent on the ability of
individual players employed by the club, any restraint on competition for the services of players
inevitably affects the product market. Id.
155. See id. at 238-39 (noting that it is well-settled law that professionals who sell their
services to the public are independent contractors and that supplying of a service by an
independent contractor is not a labor market transaction but is instead a product market
transaction).
156. Schnell, supra note 30, at 3-4.
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procompetitive, the residents will need to show that all of the NRMP's
legitimate justifications could have been achieved through a less
restrictive alternative.
1 57
Given that programs can still compete within the NRMP since
they remain free to set terms that they feel will be most attractive to
prospective residents, the court may conclude that the Match is not an
unreasonable restraint. 158 It is in a hospital's best interest to make its
terms as attractive as possible to ensure high placement on preferred
candidates' match lists.159 Still, even though hospitals can create
distinctively attractive terms if they wish, there remains suspicious
salary uniformity among residency programs despite some disparity in
program prestige, resident merit, medical specialty, and variable cost
of living. 160
2. Learned Profession Exemption
The defendants will not avoid the Sherman Act by arguing that
the medical community, as a learned profession, must be allowed to
self-regulate. At one time, learned professions received special
treatment under antitrust laws. 161 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,162 however, the Supreme Court dispelled this notion and held
that the learned professions deserve no sweeping exemption from the
Sherman Act. 163 To gain an exemption, defendants would have to look
157. Id. at 4.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Adam Liptak, Medical Students Sue Over Residency System, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002,
at Al. Notwithstanding the various nonwage related competitive advantages between programs,
these factors do not justify uniformly low resident salaries.
161. Michael A. Kaplan, Annotation, "Learned Profession" Exemption in Federal Antitrust
Laws (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et seq.), 39 A.L.R. FED. 774, § 2(a) (1978). It was stated in dictum in The
Schooner Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506 (C.C.D. Me 1834), that wherever any occupation, employment,
or business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, "not in the liberal arts
or in the learned professions," it is consistently called a trade. Id. Also in dictum, the Supreme
Court, in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), stated that medical practitioners "follow a
profession and not a trade." Id.
162. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
163. Kaplan, supra note 161, § 2(a) (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975)). It seems well-established that a learned profession exemption argument must fail since
the Court has consistently held that the Sherman Act strikes widely enough that every person,
regardless of occupation, is subject to its strictures when that person engages in a proscribed
restraint of trade. Id; see also James F. Blumstein, Student Protests: Is the National Resident
Matching Program in Violation of Antitrust Laws?, 4 Med. Crossfire 31, 31 (2002),
http://medicalcrossfire.com/debate-archive/2002/JulO2/StudentProtests.pdf (last visited Sept. 1,
2003). In 1975, the Supreme Court applied the antitrust laws to the practice of law, in 1978 to
the practice of engineering, and in 1986 to the practice of dentistry. Dennis R. Bartholomew,
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to the legislature.16 4 Congress has the power to create exemptions
from the antitrust laws for specific circumstances and specific
industries if it determines that public policy requires it to do so.
165
However, such congressional exemptions are rare.
166
3. Public Policy Defense
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to promote behavior that
maximizes consumer welfare through unrestricted competition, which
is believed to increase economic efficiency.167 As a result, defendants
cannot successfully argue that the NRMP remedies inherent flaws in
the free labor market. The Sherman Act presumes that competition is
in the best interests of the public and the economy. 168
The defendants may argue that the medical profession's
collusive behavior is necessary as part of its commitment to public
Comment, Antitrust and the Professions: Where Do We Go from Here?, 29 VILL. L. REV. 115, 117
(1984).
164. See infra Part V.B (discussing a possible legislative exemption from antitrust laws).
165. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 88, at 29.
166. See Bartholomew, supra note 163, at 120-22 (explaining that the 1945 McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, provided for a limited federal antitrust exemption for the
insurance industry, which is heavily regulated by states); infra note 213 and accompanying text.
See generally Eric Peter Gillett, Comment, The Business of Insurance: Exemption, Exemption,
Who Has the Antitrust Exemption, 17 PAC. L.J. 261 (1985) (providing useful background on the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, and its impact on the insurance industry).
167. Piraino, supra note 105, at 1767-68. The Sherman Act reflects Congress's judgment
that "competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market." Jerry & Knebel,
supra note 89, at 175 (citing National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435
U.S. at 679, 695 (1978)). The efficient allocation of resources enhances consumer welfare because
competition lowers prices and results in better goods and services. Id.
168. ' The purpose of a rule of reason analysis is to 'form a judgment about the competitive
significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the
public interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry."' Blumstein & Sloan, supra note
88, at 28 (citing National Society of Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692). Even the "worthy
purpose" defense for professional associations, first articulated in Wilk v. AMA, 719 F.2d 207 (7th
Cir. 1983) is unlikely to excuse anticompetitive restraints on resident labor. The worthy purpose
defense permits values other than competition to enter into the antitrust analysis as a
justification for certain types of anticompetitive professional activity. Blumstein & Sloan, supra
note 88, at 29 (citing Wilk, 719 F.2d at 207). The defense originated when the Seventh Circuit
purported to rely on Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in National Society of Professional
Engineers. Id. at 30 (citing National Society of Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 699-701
(Blackmun, J., concurring)). The Seventh Circuit read Justice Blackmun's opinion to state that a
more flexible approach should be used when dealing with professional associations in order to
recognize benefits that are important to a profession's proper ordering, other than those of
increased competition. Id. (citing Wilk, 719 F.2d at 226). Nonetheless, the worthy purpose
defense lacks credibility because the Seventh Circuit ostensibly relied upon "what is, in effect, a
dissenting opinion to carve out a defense seemingly barred by a majority of the Supreme Court."
Id. at 30-31.
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service. 169 Antitrust law assumes that all commercial entities are
motivated, almost solely, by maximizing profit. 170  Professionals,
however, may not fit this assumption. 171 There are considerable
expectations placed upon doctors, especially medical residents, to
provide their services without regard to potential profit. 172  Such
expectations increase the ethical standards of the medical profession
and serve to regulate those members who do not live up to the
minimum expectations. Treating doctors like profiteers, as antitrust
laws currently do, may create a self-fulfilling prophecy where doctors
are driven solely by profit to the detriment of patient care. 73 Still, the
Jung court is unlikely to be persuaded by policy arguments in favor of
the Match for the same reasons that preclude an exemption defense. 74
D. Balance Weighs in Residents' Favor
The plaintiffs have a strong chance at prevailing on their claim
that the NRMP is anticompetitive under section one of the Sherman
Act. Defendants' market power coupled with the lack of wage
competition has the general effect of severely limiting applicants'
employment options and terms. Although the NRMP does not directly
establish resident salaries or working conditions, its single placement
assignment effectively eliminates salary competition between
programs. Overall, defendants' possible justifications for the Match
appear to be largely policy-based, rather than legally grounded. Even
if defendants present strong evidence of efficiencies created by the
NRMP, the court will likely find that such efficiencies can exist within
a less restrictive structure.
The consequences of a plaintiff-favoring verdict are significant
for residents, participating programs, and patients. If the court
certifies the case as a class action, 175 the plaintiff class could include
169. See Christopher J. Gawley, Protecting Professionals from Competition: The Necessity of
a Limited Antitrust Exemption for Professionals, 47 S.D. L. REV., 233, 233, 246-48 (2002)
(observing that "professionals continue to engage in concerted behavior that would otherwise be
unlawful under the antitrust laws, but for their professional status").
170. Gawley, supra note 169, at 233, 247.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 233, 248.
174. See Kaplan, supra note 161, § 2(a) (citing the holding of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975), which does not allow professionals special treatment under antitrust law);
see also supra notes 161-166 and accompanying text (stating that learned professions are not
immune from antitrust scrutiny).
175. At the time of publication, the court had not yet certified the case as a class action.
Nat'l Resident Matching Program, Save the Match, FAQ, Why is Class Certification Important to
the Plaintiffs?, at http://www.savethematch.org/faq/all/aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2003). One or
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more than 200,000 persons 176 with the defendant class including more
than 1,000 entities nationwide. 177 Pecuniary damages, which are
tripled in antitrust cases, could easily cost the defendants several
hundred million dollars. 178 Such a blow could send the entire health
care industry into financial turmoil. 79 Aside from the financial
consequences, the United States healthcare system faces the prospect
of being forced to change the way that generations of doctors have
been trained.180 Without the NRMP, hospitals would again confront
the possibility of accepting too many or too few residents.
From the residents' point of view, a court order mandating
changes in the NRMP would significantly impact their professional
lives. With the ability to entertain competing offers, most applicants
would undoubtedly benefit. Still, the extent to which programs would
be willing and able to offer increased salaries remains unclear.
Importantly, patient care would be affected in both positive and
negative ways. Patient care may improve if residents are allowed to
influence their working conditions.181 On the other hand, injecting a
financial incentive into the resident placement equation might enable
well-funded private programs to lure the best candidates. Given that
a significant portion of the population cannot afford treatment in
more members of a class may sue as representative parties on behalf of the group if: "1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, 2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, 3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and 4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class." FED R. Civ. P. 23(a)
176. Complaint, supra note 5, 52. "Plaintiffs bring the suit on behalf of themselves and as
a class action ... on behalf of all persons employed as resident physicians in ACGME-accredited
residency programs ... since May 7, 1998." Id. 51.
177. Id. 59. The Defendant Class consists of the following: 1) all NRMP institutional
participants since May 6, 1998, 2) all AAMC member hospitals since May 7, 1998 and 3) all
ACBME-accredited sponsoring institutions since May 7, 1998. Id. 58. The Defendant Class
excludes all government entities, including hospitals and counties. Id.
178. A plaintiff alleging economic injury flowing from any violation of federal antitrust laws
is entitled to recover treble damages. John P. Ludington, Annotation, Measure and Elements of
Damages Under 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 Entitling Person Injured in His Business or Property by Reason
of Anything Forbidden in Federal Antitrust Laws to Recover Treble Damages, 16 A.L.R. FED. 14
(1973); see also 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 601 (2003) (stating that the
burden of showing injury-in-fact requires only that the plaintiff prove the defendant's illegal
conduct was a material cause of the injury incurred). In this case, for example, if damages of
$1000 per plaintiff were awarded then automatically tripled to $3,000, a class consisting of
200,000 people would carry a total judgment of $600,000,000. Nat'l Resident Matching Program,
Save the Match, FAQ, Why Is Class Certification Important to the Plaintiffs?, at
http://www.savethematch.org/faq/all.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
179. Schnell, supra note 30, at 4.
180. Liptak, supra note 160.
181. See id. (quoting Dr. Jung as stating that "(riesidents want to be treated fairly, and
patients want to be treated well. Patient care will improve if you let residents have more say in
their working conditions.").
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private hospitals, those patients seeking care at government-funded
public programs would have to be satisfied with potentially less
qualified residents. Finally, if hospitals employ fewer residents
because of the higher recruitment and salary costs associated with
open competition, residents may have to work longer hours and treat
more patients.
Given these concerns, what should be the solution if the court
finds the Match to be in violation of antitrust laws? Conversely, even
if the court upholds the legality of the NRMP, it may be time to revise
the current system. Either way, the Jung case forces all parties
involved to re-evaluate the employment conditions facing medical
residents.
V. RESUSCITATING THE MATCH: THREE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES IN A
POST-JUNG ERA
If the Jung plaintiffs are successful and the NRMP disappears,
the medical community must solve the problems posed by medical
resident employment. Should the court enjoin the Match, leaving
residents with a free labor market? Will Congress intervene to create
a legislative exemption? This Part will analyze three possible
scenarios ultimately concluding that a compromise provides the most
promising resolution.
The unique nature of the residency system merits a novel
approach that goes beyond simply abandoning or maintaining the
current placement mechanism. With few exceptions, the residency
program is distinct among professions in its need for an exact number
of entrants to satisfy staffing and budgetary concerns. Furthermore,
medical training is distinctive in that it requires extensive
postgraduate training over a period of several years. This long-term
commitment magnifies the effects that a placement system has on
residents and hospitals alike.
A. Overhaul the NRMP in Favor of Free Market Approach
Elimination of the NRMP is the most obvious outcome if a
court concludes that the Match violates the Sherman Act. On its face,
this appears to be an acceptable and uncomplicated resolution, given
that virtually all jobs in the United States are unregulated. Assuming
that the Jung suit is successful in invalidating the NRMP, a free
market for resident labor is a distinct possibility.
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In a free labor market, medical students would apply for
residencies in the same way that most other people apply for jobs.
18 2
Since fourth-year students already apply for positions and participate
in on-site interviews, much like the general labor market, this shift
appears relatively inconsequential.1 8 3 A free market approach would
merely replace the NRMP with a negotiable interchange of offers and
acceptances, giving medical students the opportunity to individualize
the terms of their employment prior to accepting an offer.
This structure proved unsuccessful in the 1950s.1 8 4 However, a
limited free market approach may still be possible.18 5 For example,
some observers suggest restrictions on the free market model, such as
a uniform deadline for student applications and hospital decisions
combined with a common student response date.186 This model
mirrors, in some respects, the National Association for Law
Placement, which is the law student's version of the NRMP.18 7 The
success of the modified free market in legal recruiting makes this
approach more appealing.
A restricted free labor market suggests, however, that some
aspects of the NRMP may be appropriate in the resident placement
context. While a market-based system would theoretically increase
the fair market value of resident services and would comport with
antitrust law, at least four significant concerns overshadow the
potential benefits of the free market approach.
First, even in an open market, residents may have little real
ability to negotiate employment contracts. As with many jobs, the
terms of employment may be effectively fixed for all candidates.
Second, the institution of a free labor market would circumvent
the purpose behind the NRMP. An important benefit of the Match is
its efficient, organized selection process in which all parties submit
and receive placement preferences at the same time.188 In a free labor
182. Blumstein, supra note 163, at 32.
183. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9, at 4; Davis, supra note 144.
184. See Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9, at 2 (describing the "chaos" of the
pre-Match era).
185. See Blumstein, supra note 163, at 32.
186. Id.
187. See Nat'l Ass'n for Law Placement, History (stating that NALP was founded in response
"to a perceived need by many law schools and legal employers for a common forum to discuss
issues involving placement and recruitment"), at http://www.nalp.org/about/history.htm (last
visited Sept. 1, 2003). Virtually all American Bar Association-accredited law schools and many of
the nation's legal employers voluntarily comply with the NALP guidelines. See Nat'l Ass'n for
Law Placement, Principles and Standards, at http://www.nalp.org/pands/index.html (last visited
Sept. 22, 2003).
188. See supra Part II.B.
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market, residency programs would likely spend more time and money
recruiting medical students since the placement burden would shift
from the externally operated NRMP onto the internal resources of
individual hospitals. Higher costs associated with recruiting activities
are an attendant evil of the free market employment process.
Third, a market-based system creates the possibility that a
residency program will receive more acceptances than it can
accommodate. This is a daunting prospect for programs, which have
strict budgeting and staffing needs. In a free labor market, hospitals
would invariably risk under- or overstaffing. While most employers
face this dilemma in the recruiting process, in a hospital setting
patient care is tied to physician staffing. Simply put, hospitals are the
last places where society wants unpredictable staffing.
Finally, a free labor market would introduce politics into the
resident placement process. The NRMP was designed, in part, to
foster merit-driven competition by creating a non-political placement
mechanism.18 9 The increased presence of politics in resident hiring
could lead to inferior patient care if resident positions were no longer
awarded solely on the basis of merit. Assuming that the NRMP does,
in fact, minimize the influence of politics, completely abandoning the
current system may not provide an optimal solution.
B. Keep the Current System: Legislative Exemption from Antitrust
Laws
If a court concludes that the Match violates the Sherman Act,
saving the NRMP will require federal legislation. 190  Since the
Supreme Court decisively ruled in Goldfarb'91 and National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States192 that learned professions are
not inherently immune from antitrust scrutiny, Match proponents
would have to convince Congress that the NRMP promotes the public's
189. See, e.g., Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9, at 2-3 ('The lack of a formal
system during the pre-Match era was tailor-made for an 'old-boy's' network. Students fortunate
enough to have the backing of a well-known member of the medical education community had an
advantage over other qualified applicants in securing the most coveted positions.").
190. Blumstein, supra note 163, at 32.
191. 421 U.S. 773 (1978); see Bartholomew, supra note 163, at 126-29 (noting that the
Sherman Act does apply to the professions); supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text
(discussing the holding and impact of Goldfarb).
192. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). See Bartholomew, supra note 163, at 130-32 (stating that the
Supreme Court, in Professional Engineers, reaffirmed that no broad exemption under the rule of
reason exists for professions); supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text (discussing the
holding and impact of Professional Engineers).
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best interest despite its anticompetitive effects. 193 With an exemption,
the NRMP could continue to exist in its present form.
194
Setting aside the legal issues surrounding the NRMP, the
process does have some definite advantages over a free labor market.
First, its formalized structure and efficient administration cannot be
ignored. Uniform deadlines combined with computer-generated
placement lists undoubtedly simplify the entire process for both
hospitals and students.195 Second, the Match does appear to maximize
applicant preferences and acceptances. In 2003, over 63% of fourth-
year medical students who participated in the NRMP were matched to
their first choice program.1 96 Another 15% matched to their second
choice program with 8% matching to their third choice program.
1 97
Thus, over 86% of medical school seniors matched to one of their top
three choices in 2003.198 Third, the NRMP ensures that the majority
of hospitals will employ the exact number of incoming residents that
they need. 99 Fourth, after having been a part of the residency
experience for more than fifty years, the Match remains firmly
ingrained in the culture of the medical community. 200 As a result,
overhauling the NRMP is unlikely to occur without resistance from
those inside the medical profession who feel that the legal system
should not interfere with the placement of residents.
201
193. See generally Gillett, supra note 166, at 265-66 (examining the application of a
legislative exemption, via the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, to the insurance
industry).
194. See id.
195. See Am. Med. Ass'n, National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) Antitrust
Litigation: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
category/8231.html (last modified July 30, 2003).
196. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, Save the Match, FAQ, Why Do Students and
Programs Have Such High Confidence in the Match?, at http://www.savethematch.org/faq
all.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing the post-Match
"scramble" that occurs if any residency programs fail to fill all of their positions during the
regular Match).
200. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 27. Today's NRMP has been in existence
since 1952, and it seems that the old guard continues to support the concept of the NRMP for its
ease in administration and perceived improvements over the pre-NRMP free market. See supra
Part II.B.
201. See Dr. John Sergent, Doctors Shouldn't Stray From Residency Tradition, THE
TENNESSEAN, May 14, 2002, at A9 ("Maybe I'm old enough to be nostalgic about the past, but I
hate to see too many changes in the traditional view... . The post-doctoral medical education
process in the United States is the envy of the world, but it is a fragile institution. If this lawsuit
is reduced to a simple antitrust battle, with no consideration of the education and training of
these physicians, it is not only the hospitals whu will lose. We all will."), available at 2002 WL
19905420.
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Still, congressional creation of statutory shelter leaves a
problematic structure in place while prohibiting residents from
seeking recourse under antitrust laws. A study documenting the
experiences of medical students during the 1998 match evidences the
tension between the medical establishment and residents' opinion of
the NRMP. 20 2 The study revealed that only 40% of residents surveyed
believe the Match to be a reasonable placement process requiring no
changes. 20 3  52% of residents surveyed felt the process could be
improved, 4% believed it needs to be overhauled, and another 4%
advocated its elimination.20 4 Finally, concluding that the NRMP's
prohibition on prematch commitments is often ignored by both
applicants and programs, the survey also indicates that the Match
does not necessarily deter "unprofessional behavior and
gamesmanship ."205
Low salaries, allegedly resulting in part from the Match, rank
chief among resident complaints. Despite their advanced education,
long work hours, and valuable patient care services, first-year
residents earned an average salary of only $35,700 during the 2000-
2001 employment year, equating to roughly $10 per hour.20 6 Adjusted
for inflation, the average first-year resident salary has remained
virtually unchanged for more than thirty years.20 7 Compared to other
hospital employees, such as nurse practitioners and physician
assistants, residents earn less on both an annual and hourly basis. 208
202. See Kimberly D. Anderson et al., Is Match Ethics an Oxymoron?, 177 AM. J. SURGERY
237, 237-39 (Mar. 1999) (reporting the results of a study designed to examine ethical dilemmas
faced by students and programs during the Match).
203. Id. at 238.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 239. A survey of 314 senior medical students from three medical schools revealed
that 43% of students perceive that programs make "informal" pre-match commitments, 33% feel
that programs lie to them, and 21% believe that programs encourage unethical behavior to
secure a match. Id.; see Peter J. Carek et al., Recruitment Behavior and Program Directors:
How Ethical Are Their Perspectives about the Match Process, 32 FAMILY MED. 258-60 (Apr. 2000)
(stating that 94% of family practice program directors surveyed felt the NRMP placed their
program in the position of having to be dishonest with applicants in order to match their top
choice candidates, thus concluding that the action of many program directors and applicants may
not be consistent with the NRMP's written policies); see also Peter J. Carek & Kimberly D.
Anderson, Residency Selection Process and the Match: Does Anyone Believe Anybody?, 285 JAMA
2784, 2784-85 (June 2001) (summarizing various studies regarding NRMP ethical violations and
concluding that the NRMP does perpetuate unfairness in the recruiting process despite claims to
the contrary).
206. Complaint, supra note 5, 93; see Coyle, supra note 24 (quoting class counsel Michael
Freed of Chicago's Much Shelist Freed Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, who represent named
plaintiff Dr. Paul Jung). Following their first year, residents are paid only slightly more based
on their year of seniority. Id.




To demonstrate that resident wages are set below competitive
levels, the Jung plaintiffs highlight the fact that residents can earn
substantially more than their hourly rate by moonlighting, even
though many hospitals prohibit this practice. 209 Moreover, resident
salaries remain suspiciously uniform nationwide. 210 By contrast, post-
residency physicians earn compensation that varies widely depending
on geographic location and medical specialty.
211
Regardless of the Match's debatable advantages and
disadvantages, congressional action seems unlikely. First, Congress is
historically reluctant to create antitrust exceptions. 212 Second, the
NRMP does not resemble other exempt industries. Exempt industries
are generally either regulated by other governmental agencies
charged with protecting the public interest 213 or are thought to require
the special protection that unrestricted unionization provides. 214 No
state or federal government agency regulates the NRMP. Further,
competition between employers is generally thought to benefit
applicants.
209. Id. 93; see Transcript of Motions Hearing (A.M. Session), Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med.
Colls., No. 02-0873 (D.D.C. filed May 7, 2002), at 65 (using moonlighting as an example of wage
depression since residents often earn higher salaries moonlighting than they earn in their actual
program), at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/jungcomplaintlamtranscript.pdf (last visited Sept.
1, 2003).
210. Complaint, supra note 5, 94; see Coyle, supra note 24 (quoting plaintiffs' class
counsel, Michael Freed, who stated in the interview that salaries don't vary more than $3,000
across the country). One of plaintiffs' claims is that teaching hospitals regularly exchange survey
results about resident salaries. AAIM, supra note 70. Plaintiffs say the result is a Matching
Program that enables employers to obtain residents without engaging in a bidding war, thereby
artificially fixing, depressing, standardizing and stabilizing compensation below competitive
levels. Id. However, the residency programs named as defendants in this case will likely argue
that factors such as program prestige, medical specialty and geographic location provide
sufficient competition, eliminating a legal need to modify current resident salaries. Complaint,
supra note 5, 94.
211. Complaint, supra note 5, 94.
212. See supra Part IV.C.2.
213. Insurance companies and stock exchanges are the best examples of industries exempted
due to government agency regulation. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011,
federal antitrust laws are not applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that it is
regulated by state law. In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975), the Court
held that although the 1934 Securities Exchange Act contains no express exemption from
antitrust laws, an exemption was implied because application of antitrust laws to commission
rates would "unduly interfere ... with the operation of the Securities Exchange Act." Id. at 685-
86. In both industries, exemptions apply because of state government regulation and federal
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
214. Agricultural organizations, for example, are expressly exempted from antitrust laws
under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6 (2000), as well as under the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §
291 (2000), because such organizations are "instituted for purposes of mutual help." 15 U.S.C. §
6 (2000).
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C. Reform the Current System: Combine the Free Market Approach
and Match Process
Both a free labor market and the maintenance of the status quo
leave much to be desired in the context of medical resident placement.
Combining elements of both, however, so as to modify rather than
eliminate the NRMP, offers the optimal solution to this dilemma.
This Note proposes revising the NRMP to incorporate one of
the most important characteristics of a market-based system: freedom
of choice. The existing Match framework should be altered to allow
applicants to receive two possible matches. After receiving up to two
choices, students would have a set period of time to make a final,
binding decision. During this period of "binding dual matching,"
students would have the opportunity to choose between the matches
but would still be required to accept one of the offers. This relatively
small change goes a long way toward creating a system that resembles
a free labor market since applicants would be free to choose from one
of two competing offers.
By allowing students to entertain two simultaneous offers, the
modified NRMP combines the free market system with the existing
placement structure to accomplish seven objectives: 1) students gain
some degree of bargaining power by virtue of their ability to entertain
competing offers; 2) students are better positioned to choose where
they will live and work for the next several years; 3) programs
continue to use a familiar resident placement process; 4) programs are
able to better compete for candidates; 5) programs retain the degree of
hiring precision required in an industry dedicated to providing patient
care; 215 6) the NRMP continues to administer an efficient system that
requires modification rather than elimination; and 7) the reformed
NRMP minimizes alleged restraints on trade by injecting the element
of competition into the current placement process.
Allowing students to entertain competing offers helps cure
antitrust concerns because programs would finally be forced to offer
competitive advantages above and beyond prestige and facilities in
order to secure their top candidates. The Jung complaint states that
the current NRMP "eliminates a free and competitive market ... [by]
assigning resident physicians to a single, specific and mandatory
residency position."216 It further claims that the NRMP has the "effect
of depressing, standardizing and stabilizing compensation and other
215. See supra Part V.A (noting that the free market leads to unpredictability in staffing);
supra Part V.B (observing that the Match prevents overbooking).
216. See generally Complaint, supra note 5, 1 83-86.
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terms of employment. 217 The three alleged anticompetitive restraints
include mandatory participation in the Match, 218 lack of individual
contract negotiations,219 and policies that mandate compliance with
the restraints.220 Mandatory participation and compliance practically
ensure that there will be no competition between programs with
regard to compensation. Thus, infusing competition would likely
dispose of these two grievances. In addition, allowing two options
decreases the necessity of individual contract negotiations since
programs would inevitably be forced to offer competitive salaries and
better overall employment terms.
While program prestige is an undoubtedly strong determinant
in a candidate's decision to rank a particular program, its importance
is likely amplified by the current uniformity in resident compensation.
Given a choice between two similarly regarded programs, an applicant
is likely to prefer the most prestigious program even if the other offers
a slightly higher salary. Under the current placement process,
programs remain completely free to capitalize on this reality without
the threat of losing a preferred candidate to a higher paying program.
However, if a program knows that an applicant is likely to have a
competing offer, that program may increase its salary to ensure
obtaining its preferred candidates. 22' The possibility of a competing
offer thereby compels programs to adopt a free market mentality with
regard to compensation. As a result, binding dual matching
represents a small yet important step toward allowing a competitive
job market to determine the fair market value of resident services.
Although binding dual matching could result in too many or too
few incoming residents, the magnitude of this consequence is
minimized because applicants would be required to accept one of the
matches and would have only two outstanding offers. Hospitals could
therefore plan accordingly. Moreover, the slight increase in staffing
uncertainty experienced under a revised Match would still be less
217. Id. 83.
218. Id. 86.1. The NRMP requires that participating programs offer all first-year positions
through the Match. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, Save the Match, Basic Rules, at
http://www.savethematch.org/include/popup.aspx?id=000320873205 (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
Moreover, student participation is effectively mandatory given that the overwhelming majority
of programs participate in the Match. See supra Part I.B.
219. Id. 86.2.
220. Id. 86.3; see supra Part II.B.3 (addressing the consequences of a Match violation).
221. Contra Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, Relationship Between Wages and Presence ofa
Match in Medical Fellowships, 290 JAMA 1153-54 (Sept. 3, 2003) (concluding, after an empirical
study, that because fellowship wages are unrelated to the presence of a match, eliminating the
resident match would not necessarily increase residents' wages).
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than that experienced in a free labor market with an indefinite
number of offers.
The proposed modification of the NRMP represents a starting
point for reform. As a general matter, a court is much more likely to
either preserve or abolish the Match than it is to articulate specific
guidelines for reform. 222 Thus, faced with possible liability under its
present structure, the NRMP should consider making proactive
changes independent of a court order. On its own, a free labor market
proved an unworkable system223 yet the current system faces
criticisms that go beyond antitrust legality issues. 224 The unique
nature of required postgraduate resident training for an extended
period of years warrants an innovative approach to the medical
resident job placement process. While the most vigorous reform
proponents will likely argue that two matches are still too few, it is
important to remember that this proposal represents a compromise
rather than a complete victory for either side.
VI. REFORMING THE MATCH HARMONIZES THE COMPETING INTERESTS
OF PROGRAMS AND APPLICANTS
The abolition or modification of the NRMP carries the greatest
impact for students and programs. Students hope to gain leverage in
their employment placement process while hospitals feel pressure to
fill spots efficiently, maintain a budget, and still attract the best
possible candidates. Reforming the NRMP through binding dual
matching offers a satisfactory solution for both parties.
Students gain ultimate decisional power-the fundamental
advantage of a free labor market-which fosters competition among
programs. Students further benefit by continuing to obtain residency
positions through a familiar and efficient placement process that
optimizes student preferences. 225 Hospitals also benefit in at least
four ways. First, the matching process remains outsourced to the care
of the NRMP, saving programs from the burden of internal
administration of resident placement. 226  Second, with only two
possible matches, programs can anticipate staffing concerns and
adjust their preference lists to ensure efficient fulfillment of resident
222. Importantly, a court is not qualified to do so. The matter is beyond judicial competency.
See 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 8 (2003) (outlining the scope of judicial powers and the need
to exercise "restraint and discretion in judgments).
223. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the history of the Match).
224. See supra Part V.B (examining some notable downfalls of the NRMP).
225. See supra Part V.B.
226. See supra Part V.A-B.
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slots. 227 Third, programs are better able to attract top candidates by
offering more competitive salary packages. Fourth, patient care
improves when hospitals have the most talented and qualified
residents they can afford.
Finally, Medicare spending on graduate medical education
would likely remain constant even if resident salaries increased since
the majority of such funding comes from the fixed payment of
recipient services. 228  Therefore, remodeling the NRMP to allow
students to entertain competing offers benefits each interested party.
VII.CONCLUSION
The Jung legal challenge underscores the need to reform the
potentially unlawful NRMP. Given that the Match was formed in
response to problems associated with placing residents through a free
labor market, abandoning the current system in favor of a free market
seems an unattractive solution. 229  Additionally, many medical
professionals would argue that the NRMP has worked successfully for
over fifty years. 230 Indeed, some features of a matching process are
well-suited for the unique context of graduate medical education.
Precise matching, the efficiency of uniform deadlines, and a
centralized structure appear to alleviate chaos in resident
placement. 231 Still, a competitive free market offers students
undeniable advantages in choosing between offers and bargaining for
better employment terms. 232
227. Id.
228. See supra Part II.
229. See supra Parts IIB, V.A.
230. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
231. See supra Part V.B.
232. See supra Part V.A.
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A compromise between a free labor market and the current
matching process offers a communally beneficial framework for
reform. Revising the Match to include fundamental free market
choice furthers the interests of residents, programs, and the
government while protecting the legality of the medical resident
placement process. Accordingly, the NRMP should proactively seek
ways, like binding dual matching, to introduce vital competition into
the presently stagnated system.
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